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Abstract
As artificial agents proliferate, it is becoming in-
creasingly important to ensure that their interac-
tions with one another are well-behaved. In this
paper, we formalize a common-sense notion of
when algorithms are well-behaved: an algorithm
is safe if it does no harm. Motivated by recent
progress in deep learning, we focus on the spe-
cific case where agents update their actions ac-
cording to gradient descent. The paper shows
that that gradient descent converges to a Nash
equilibrium in safe games. The main contribu-
tion is to define strongly-typed agents and show
they are guaranteed to interact safely, thereby
providing sufficient conditions to guarantee safe
interactions. A series of examples show that
strong-typing generalizes certain key features of
convexity, is closely related to blind source sepa-
ration, and introduces a new perspective on clas-
sical multilinear games based on tensor decom-
position.
1. Introduction “First, do no harm”
Recent years have seen rapid progress on core problems
in artificial intelligence such as object and voice recog-
nition (Hinton & et al, 2012; Krizhevsky et al., 2012),
playing video and board games (Mnih et al., 2015; Sil-
ver et al., 2016), and driving autonomous vehicles (Zhang
et al., 2016). As artificial agents proliferate, it is increas-
ingly important to ensure their interactions with one an-
other, with humans, and with their environment are safe.
Concretely, the number of neural networks being trained
and used is growing rapidly. There are enormous and in-
creasing economies of scale that can likely be derived from
treating them as populations – rather than as isolated algo-
rithms. How to ensure interacting neural networks cooper-
ate effectively? When can weights trained on one problem
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be adapted to another without adverse effects? The prob-
lems fall under mechanism design, a branch of game theory
(Nisan et al., 2007). However, neural nets differ from hu-
mans in that they optimize clear objectives using gradient
descent. The setting is thus more structured than traditional
mechanism design.
Safety. The first contribution of the paper is formalize
safety as a criterion on how agents interact. We propose
a basic notion of safety based on the common-sense prin-
ciple that agents should do no harm to one another. More
formally, each agent optimizes an objective whose value
depends on the actions of the agent and the actions of the
rest of the population. A game is safe if the actions chosen
by each agent do no (infinitesimal) harm to any other agent,
where harm is measured as increased loss.
The key simplifying assumption in the paper is to take gra-
dient descent as a computational primitive (Balduzzi,
2016). Questions about mechanism design are sharp-
ened under the assumption that agents use gradient de-
scent. The assumption holds broadly since the key driver
of progress in artificial intelligence is deep learning, which
uses gradient descent to optimize complicated objective
functions composed from simple differentiable modules
(LeCun et al., 2015).
A weakness of the approach is that it conceives safety more
narrowly than, for example, Amodei et al. (2016) which is
concerned with societal risks arising from artificial intelli-
gence. We argue that a necessary foundational component
of the broader AI-safety project is to clarify exactly what
safety entails when the objectives of the agents and the al-
gorithms they employ are precisely specified.
Strongly-typed games. The second contribution is to in-
troduce type systems suited to multi-agent optimization
problems (that is, games). We build on the typed linear
algebra introduced in Balduzzi & Ghifary (2016). The
nomenclature is motivated by an analogy with types in the
theory of programming. Type systems are used to prevent
untrapped errors (errors that go unnoticed and cause arbi-
trary behavior later on) when running a program (Cardelli,
1997). A program is safe if it does not cause untrapped er-
rors. Type systems can enforce safety by statically rejecting
all programs that are potentially unsafe.
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The idea underlying types in programming is that “like
should interact with like”. Typed linear algebra, defini-
tion 1, formalizes “like interacts with like” in the simplest
possible way – by fixing an orthogonal basis. Section 2 in-
troduces a wider class of games than in the literature and
defines safety. Theorem 1 shows that gradient descent con-
verges to a Nash equilibrium in safe games. Section 3 ex-
tracts the key ingredients required for safe gradients from
two warmup examples. The ingredients are simultaneous
diagonalization, i.e. the existence of a shared latent or-
thogonal basis, and monotonic covariation, i.e. that the
derivatives of the objectives have the same sign in the la-
tent coordinate system. The main result, theorem 2, is that
strongly-typed games are guaranteed to be safe.
Implications. Safety and strong-typing generalize key
properties of convexity. Convexity is of course the gold
standard for well-behaved gradients. We uncover latent
types and demonstrate safety of Newton’s method, natural
gradient and mirror descent; see sections 3.2, A2 and A3.
The main theme of sections 4 and 5 is disentangling latent
factors. We show that strong-typing in quadratic games is
closely related to blind source separation. Section 5 ana-
lyzes classical N -player games. The analysis yields a new
perspective on classical games based on tensor-SVD that is
closely related to independent component analysis.
Sections 6 and A6 switch to neural networks and ana-
lyze two biologically plausible variants of backpropagation
(Balduzzi et al., 2015; Lillicrap et al., 2016). We show that
the main results of the papers are to prove the respective
algorithms are safe.
Scope and related work. This paper lays the foundations
of safety in gradient-based optimization. Applications are
deferred to future work.
The literature on safety is mostly focused on problems aris-
ing in reinforcement learning, for example ensuring agents
avoid dangerous outcomes (Turchetta et al., 2016; Amodei
et al., 2016; Berkenkamp et al., 2016). Gradients are typi-
cally not available in reinforcement learning problems. We
study interactions between algorithms with clearly defined
objectives that utilize gradient-based optimization, which
gives a more technical perspective.
The idea of a population of neural networks solving mul-
tiple related tasks is developed in Fernando et al. (2017),
which uses genetic algorithms to adapt components to new
tasks. However, they repeatedly reinitialize components to
undo the damage done by the genetic algorithm. Our work
is intended, ultimately, to help design algorithms that detect
and avoid damaging updates. A recent survey paper argues
the brain optimizes a family of complementary loss func-
tions (Marblestone et al., 2016) without considering how
the complementarity of the loss functions could be checked
or enforced.
The idea of investigating game-theoretic and mechanism
design questions specific to certain classes of algorithms is
introduced in Rakhlin & Sridharan (2013); Syrgkanis et al.
(2015). The papers consider how convergence in games can
be accelerated if the players use variants of mirror descent.
Terminology. If α ≥ 0 then α is positive; if α > 0 then it
is strictly positive. A (not necessarily square) matrix D is
diagonal if dij = 0 for all i 6= j and similarly for tensors.
Vectors are columns. The inner product is 〈v,w〉 = vᵀw.
2. Safety
2.1. Types and orthogonal projections
Let us recall some basic facts about orthogonal projections.
Let (V, 〈•, •〉) be a vector space equipped with an inner
product. An orthogonal projection is a linear transform
pi : V → V that is
O1. idempotent, pi2 = pi, and
O2. self-adjoint, 〈piv,v′〉 = 〈v,piv′〉 for any v,v′ ∈ V .
Lemma 1. Let P denote an (n × k)-matrix with orthogo-
nal columns p1, . . . ,pk. Then the (n× n)-matrix PPᵀ =∑k
i=1 pi〈pi, •〉 =
∑k
i=1 pip
ᵀ
i is an (orthogonal) projec-
tion.
Lemma 2. If two orthogonal projectionspi and τ commute
then their product is an orthogonal projection.
Proof. Let q := piτ . If piτ = τpi then
q2 = piτ · piτ = pipi · ττ = piτ = q.
Checking self-adjointness is an exercise.
Definition 1. A type TV =
(
V, 〈•, •〉, {pir}Rr=1
)
is a D-
dimensional vector space with an inner product and or-
thogonal projections pir : V → V such that pirpis = 0
for r 6= s and ∑Rr=1 pir = IV is the identity. Type TV has
dimension D and rank R.
A full rank type, D = R, is equivalent to a vector space
equipped with an orthogonal basis. Lower rank types are
less rigid, and can be thought of as vector spaces equipped
with generalized orthogonal coordinates.
2.2. Safe games
Definition 2. A game consists of a type TV , feasible set
H ⊂ V , players [N ] := {1, . . . , N}, losses `n : H → R,
and an assignment ρ : [N ]→ [R] of players to projections.
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The type structure and assignments specify the coordinates
controlled by each player. On round t, player n chooses
ξtn ∈ V and updates the joint action via
wt+1 = wt − piρ(n)(ξtn) where wt,wt+1 ∈ H.
Updates leaving the feasible set can be mapped back into
it, see section A1. The projection piρ(n) specifies the coor-
dinates of the joint-action vector that player n can modify.
Example 1. In a block game actions w ∈ V = ∏Nn=1RDn
decompose as w = (w1, . . . ,wN ) where the nth player
can modify the coordinates in wn. The orthogonal pro-
jections pin(w) = (0, . . . ,wn, . . . ,0) form a rank-N type
with ρ(n) = n for all n ∈ [N ].
Example 2. In an open game the type has rank(TV ) = 1
so the single projection is the identity and ρ(n) = 1 for all
n. Every player can modify all the coordinates.
Block games coincide with the standard definition of a
game in the literature. Open games arise below when con-
sidering Newton’s method, natural gradients, mirror de-
scent and neural networks.
The goal of each player is to minimize its loss. Safety is the
condition that no player’s updates harm any other player.
Definition 3. It is safe for player m to choose ξtm ∈ V if
it does no infinitesimal harm to any player〈
piρ(m)(ξ
t
m),∇ `n(wt)
〉 ≥ 0 for all n ∈ [N ].
A game is safe if it is safe for players to use gradient de-
scent: i.e. if choosing ξtm := ∇ `m(wt) is safe for all m.
It is worth getting a degenerate case out of the way. A block
game is decomposable if player m’s loss only depends on
the actions it controls. Intuitively, a decomposable game is
N independent optimization problems. More formally:
Lemma 3. A block game is decomposable if `m(w) =
`m(pimw) for all w andm. Decomposable games are safe.
Proof. Since pim is self-adjoint, we have that 〈pimξ,η〉 =
〈pimξ,pimη〉. Decomposability implies pim(∇ `n) = 0
when m 6= n, so
〈
pim(∇ `m),pim(∇ `n)
〉
=
{
‖pim(∇ `m)‖22 if m = n
0 else
which is always positive.
2.3. Convergence
A block game is convex if the feasible set H is compact
and convex and the losses `n : H → R are convex in
the coordinates controlled by the respective players. Nash
equilibria are guaranteed to exist in convex block games
(Nash, 1950). However, finding them is often intractable
(Daskalakis et al., 2009). We show gradient descent con-
verges to a Nash equilibrium in safe convex games.
Theorem 1. Gradient descent converges to a Nash equi-
librium in safe convex games with smooth losses.
Proof. Introduce potential function Φ(w) =
∑N
n=1 αn ·
`n(w) where αn > 0 are strictly positive. Then
〈pim(∇Φ),∇ `m〉 =
N∑
n=1
αn
〈
pim(∇ `n),∇ `m
〉
(1)
≥ αm · ‖pim(∇ `m)‖22 ≥ 0
since safety implies the cross-terms are nonnegative. The
players’ updates therefore converge to either a critical point
of Φ or to the boundary of the feasible set. Suppose gradi-
ent descent converges to the interior of H. Eq (1) implies
that if∇Φ = 0 then pim(∇ `m) = 0 for all m. By convex-
ity of the losses, the critical point is a minimizer of each
loss with respect to that player’s actions, implying it is a
Nash equilibrium. A similar argument holds if gradient de-
scent converges to the boundary, see section A1.
Example 3 (convergence in a safe constrained game). Con-
sider a two-player block game with `1(x, y) = x+ 2y and
`2(x, y) = 2x + y where player-1 controls x and player-
2 controls y. Introduce feasible set H = {(x, y) ∈ R2 :
x2 + y2 ≤ 1}. The game is convex and safe. The set of
Nash equilibria is the bottom-left quadrant of the bound-
ary {(x, y) ∈ H : x, y ≤ 0 and x2 + y2 = 1}. Gradient
descent with positive combinations of pi1(∇ `1) = ∂∂x and
pi2(∇ `2) = ∂∂y always converges to a Nash equilibrium.
A simple game that does not converge is the following zero-
sum game, which is related to generative adversarial net-
works (Goodfellow, 2017).
Example 4 (convergence requires positivity). Consider the
two-player block game `1(x, y) = xy and `2(x, y) = −xy
where player-1 controls x and player-2 controls y. The
Nash equilibrium is the origin (x, y) = (0, 0). However,
gradient descent does not converge. Observe that ∇ `1 =
y ∂∂x + x
∂
∂y and ∇ `2 = −y ∂∂x − x ∂∂y so pi1(∇ `1) = y ∂∂x
and pi2(∇ `2) = −x ∂∂y . The flow pi1(∇ `1) + pi2(∇ `2)
rotates around the origin. No positive combination of
pi1(∇ `1) and pi2(∇ `2) converges to the origin.
3. Strongly-Typed Games
Strong-typing is based two key ideas: diagonalization and
positivity. Diagonalization is an important tool in applied
mathematics. The Fourier transform simultaneously diag-
onalizes differentiation and convolution:
F
( df
dx
)
= 2piiωF(f) and F(f ∗ g) = F(f) · F(g)
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The SVD diagonalizes any matrix: QᵀMP = D. Finally,
the Legendre transform f∗(η) = maxθ{ηᵀθ − f(θ)} di-
agonalizes the infimal convolution
(fg)∗ = f∗+g∗ for (fg)(θ) = min
ϑ
{f(ϑ)+g(θ−ϑ)}.
Diagonalization finds a latent orthogonal basis that is more
mathematically amenable than the naturally occurring co-
ordinate system. Strong-typing is based on an extension of
diagonalization to nonlinear functions. Before diving in,
we recall the basics of simultaneous diagonalization.
Symmetric matrices. Any symmetric matrix A factor-
izes as A = PᵀDP where P is orthogonal and D is di-
agonal. A collection A1, . . . ,AN of symmetric matrices
is simultaneously diagonalizable iff the matrices commute,
in which case Ai = PᵀDiP where Di is diagonal and P
determines a common latent coordinate system (or type).
Arbitrary matrices. The diagonalization of an (m×n)-
matrix A is A = PDQᵀ where P and Q are orthogonal
(m×m) and (n× n) matrices and D is positive diagonal.
A collection of matrices is simultaneously diagonalizable
if Ai = PDiQᵀ for all i. A necessary condition for simul-
taneous diagonalizability is that
Aᵀi Aj and AiA
ᵀ
j are symmetric for all i, j. (2)
Next, we work through two examples where diagonaliza-
tion and a positivity condition imply safety.
3.1. Warmup: When are two-player games safe?
To orient the reader, we consider a minimal example which
illustrates most of the main ideas of the paper: two-player
bilinear games (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Con-
sider a two-player block game with loss functions
`1(v,w) = v
ᵀAw and `2(v,w) = vᵀBw
and projections pi1/2(v,w) = (v,0) and (0,w). The
gradients are ∇ `1 =
∑
ij(wjAij
∂
∂vi
+ viAij
∂
∂wj
) =
(wᵀAᵀ,vᵀA) and ∇ `2 = (wᵀBᵀ,vᵀB). The game is
safe if
〈pi1(∇ `1),∇ `2〉 = wᵀAᵀBw ≥ 0 and
〈∇ `1,pi2(∇ `2)〉 = vᵀBAᵀv ≥ 0 for all v and w.
Safety requires that AᵀB and BAᵀ are positive semidef-
inite. Any square matrix decomposes into symmetric and
antisymmetric components M = Ms + Ma = 12 (M +
Mᵀ) + 12 (M−Mᵀ) where wᵀMaw = 0 for all w. Thus,
a square matrix is positive semidefinite iff its symmetric
component is positive semidefinite.
We therefore restrict to when AᵀB and BAᵀ are symmet-
ric. Recalling (2), we further suppose that A and B are
simultaneously diagonalizable and obtain:
Lemma 4. A two-player game is safe if A = PDQᵀ and
B = PEQᵀ where P and Q are orthogonal matrices, D
and E are diagonal, and DE ≥ 0.
Proof. The assumptions imply that
〈pi1∇ `1,∇ `2〉 = wᵀAᵀBw = wᵀQ(DᵀE)Qᵀw ≥ 0
and 〈∇ `1,pi2∇ `2〉 = wᵀP(EᵀD)Pᵀw ≥ 0.
3.2. Warmup: When is Newton’s method safe?
It was observed in Dauphin et al. (2014) that applying New-
ton’s method to neural networks is problematic because it
is attracted to saddle points and can increase the loss on
nonconvex problems. We reformulate their observation in
the language of safety.
Consider a single player open game with twice differen-
tiable loss ` : V → R and projection pi = IV . Newton’s
method optimizes ` via weight updates
wt+1 = wt− ξt with ξt = ηt ·H−1(wt) · ∇ `(wt),
where Hij(w) = ∂
2`
∂wi∂wj
(w) is the Hessian and ηt > 0.
Lemma 5. If ` is strictly convex then Newton’s method is
safe, i.e. 〈H−1∇ `,∇ `〉 ≥ 0 for all w.
Proof. Factorize the Hessian at wt as H = PDPᵀ. If ` is
strictly convex then D > 0 and so
〈H−1∇ `,∇ `〉 = 〈D−1Pᵀ∇ `,Pᵀ∇ `〉 ≥ 0
as required.
Two features are noteworthy: (i) the transform η = Pᵀξ
diagonalizes the second-order Taylor expansion of `,
compare `(w + ξ) = `(w) + ξᵀ · ∇ `+ 1
2
ξᵀHξ
with `(w + Pη) = `(w) + ηᵀ(Pᵀ∇ `) + 1
2
ηᵀDη,
and (ii) the proof hinges on the positivity of D. Sections A2
and A3 extend the approach to show the natural gradient
(Amari, 1998) and mirror descent (Raskutti & Mukherjee,
2015) are safe using the Legendre transform.
3.3. Strongly-typed games are safe
We apply the lessons from the warmups to define a factor-
ization of nonlinear functions.
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Definition 4. The functions {`n : V → R}Nn=1 simultane-
ously factorize if there is a triple(
{Pl}Ll=1, {fl : Rpl → R}Ll=1, {gn : RL → R}Nn=1
)
,
satisfying
`n(w) = gn
(
f1(P
ᵀ
1w), . . . , fL(P
ᵀ
Lw)
)
for all n
where Pl are (D×pl)-matrices whose columns jointly form
an orthogonal basis of V and fl and gn are differentiable,
and the gn’s co-vary monotonically: ∂gm∂fl
∂gn
∂fl
≥ 0.
The projections τl = PlP
ᵀ
l define a type structure on V .
Intuitively, the outputs zl = fl(P
ᵀ
l w) are latent factors
computed from the inputs w such that each zl is indepen-
dent of the others – independence is enforced by the pro-
jections τl. Monotonic covariation of the functions gn with
respect to the factors zl plays the same role as positivity in
two-player games and Newton’s method.
Definition 5. Game (TV , {`n}Nn=1) is strongly-typed if the
loss functions admit a simultaneous factorization whose
projections {τ l = PlPᵀl }Ll=1 commute with {pin}Nn=1.
Theorem 2. Strongly-typed games are safe.
Proof. Commutativity implies there is a basis {ei}Di=1 for
V that simultaneously diagonalizes the projections {pin}
and {τ l}. Express elements of V as (v1, . . . , vD) in the
basis. Safety then reduces to showing
〈pim(∇ `m),∇ `n〉 =
∑
{i:pim(ei)6=0}
∂gm
∂vi
· ∂gn
∂vi
≥ 0.
Observe that ∂fk∂vi
∂fl
∂vi
= 0 if k 6= l since fk and fl are func-
tions of orthogonal coordinates. It follows that
∂gm
∂vi
· ∂gn
∂vi
=
(
L∑
k=1
∂gm
∂fk
∂fk
∂vi
)
·
(
L∑
l=1
∂gn
∂fl
∂fl
∂vi
)
=
L∑
l=1
∂gm
∂fl
∂gn
∂fl
·
(
∂fl
∂vi
)2
≥ 0
since the gn’s co-vary monotonically.
Strong-typing is a sufficient but not necessary condition for
safety. More general definitions can be proposed according
to taste. Definition 5 is easy to check, covers the basic ex-
amples below, and incorporates the concrete intuition de-
veloped in the warmups.
3.4. Comparison with potential games
The proof of theorem 1 suggests that safe games are related
to potential games (Monderer & Shapley, 1996). In our
notation, a block game is a weighted potential game if there
exists a potential function Φ and scalar weights αn > 0
satisfying
`n(w)− `n(w +pinv) = αn ·
(
Φ(w)−Φ(w +pinv)
)
for all w,v ∈ V and n ∈ [N ].
We provide two counter-examples to show that strongly-
typed games are distinct from potential games.
Example 5 (a strongly-typed game that is not a potential
game). Let `1(x,y) = x1y1 + 2x2y2 and `2(x,y) =
3x1y1 + 4x2y2. The block game with projections onto
x and y is strongly-typed but is not a weighted potential
game.
Example 6 (a potential game that is not safe). Let
`1(x, y) = xy and `2(x, y) = xy − 9x, with projections
onto x and y. The game is a potential game but is not safe
because
〈pi1(∇ `1),∇ `2〉 = 〈(y, 0), (y − 9, x)〉 = y2 − 9y
can be negative.
4. Quadratic Games
Given a collection of (D×D)-matrices {A(n)}Nn=1 andD-
vectors {b(n)} the corresponding quadratic game has loss
functions
`n(w) =
1
2
wᵀA(n)w + wᵀb(n).
We assume the matrices A(n) are symmetric without loss
of generality.
4.1. Open quadratic games
In an open quadratic game, each player updates the entire
joint action.
Corollary 1. An open quadratic game is safe if there is
an orthogonal (D×D)-matrix P, diagonal matrices D(n)
such that D(m)D(n) ≥ 0, and D-vector b such that
A(n) = PD(n)Pᵀ and b(n) = A(n)b.
We derive corollaries 1 and 2 from theorem 2. Alternate,
direct proofs are provided in appendix A4.
Proof. Let fi(x) = x(x2 − bi) and gn(z) =
∑D
i=1 d
(n)
i · zi.
Then
`n(w) = gn
(
f1(p
ᵀ
1w), . . . , fD(p
ᵀ
Dw)
)
,
where pi are the columns of P, is strongly-typed.
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The Hessian of `n is H`n = A
(n). The conditions of corol-
lary 1 can be reformulated as (i) the Hessians of the losses
commute H`mH`n = H`nH`m for all m and n, and (ii)
the Newton steps for the losses coincide (when the Hes-
sians are nonsingular):
H−1`n (∇ `n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Newton step
= (A(n))−1A(n)(w − b) = w − b.
Example: Disentangling latent factors. An important
problem in machine learning is disentangling latent factors
(Bengio, 2013). Basic methods for tackling the problem
include PCA, canonical correlation analysis (CCA) and in-
dependent component analysis (ICA). We show how the
factorization in corollary 1 can arise “in nature” as a vari-
ant of blind source separation.
Suppose a signal on D channels is recorded for T time-
points giving (D×T )-matrix X. Assume the observations
combine L independent latent signals: X = MS where S
is an (L × T )-matrix representing the latent signal and M
is a mixing matrix.
Blind source separation is concerned with recovering the
latent signals. The covariance of the signal is A = XXᵀ.
Factorize A = PDPᵀ and let S˜ = PᵀX. Although this
may not recover the original signal, i.e. S˜ 6= S in general,
it does disentangle X into uncorrelated factors:
S˜S˜ᵀ = PᵀXXᵀP = D.
Finally, recall that finding the first principal component can
be formulated as the constrained maximization problem:
argmax
{w:‖w‖2=1}
wᵀAw.
Now suppose there are N sets of observations
X(1), . . . ,X(N) generated by a single orthogonal
mixing matrix acting on different sets of (potentially
rescaled) latent signals: X(n) = PS(n). Finding the first
principle components of the signals reduces to solving the
constrained optimization problems{
argmax
{w:‖w‖2=1}
wᵀX(n)(X(n))ᵀw
}N
n=1
(3)
Corollary 1 implies that (3) is a safe. Note the corollary im-
plies the optimization problems have compatible gradients,
not that they share a common solution. In general there are
many Nash equilibria, analogous to example 3.
Quadratic games and linear regression. The blind
source separation example assumes that the linear terms
b(n) in the loss are zero. If the linear term is nonzero
then linear regression is a special case of minimizing the
quadratic loss. Safety then relates to searching for weights
that simultaneously solve linear regression problems on
multiple datasets.
4.2. Block Quadratic Games
The block quadratic game has losses as above; however
the action space decomposes into (w1, . . . ,wN ) with cor-
responding projections. Block decompose the components
of the loss as
A(n) =

A
(n)
11 · · · A(n)1N
...
...
A
(n)
N1 · · · A(n)NN
 and b(n) =

b
(n)
1
...
b
(n)
N
 .
Corollary 2. A block quadratic game is safe if there are:
(i) (D ×D)-orthogonal P with Pmn = 0 for m 6= n;
(ii) (D × L) matrix R with Rn• diagonal for all n;
(iii) diagonal (L×L)-matrices D(n) with D(m)D(n) ≥ 0;
(iv) and a D-vector b
such that A(n) = PRD(n)RᵀPᵀ and
b(n) = A(n)b for all n.
The notation Pmn and R•n refers to blocks in the rows and
columns of P and columns of R.
Proof. Let pi denote the columns of P and gn(z) =∑L
l=1 d
(n)
l · zl. Given l, construct Pl by concatenating the
columns pi of P for which the corresponding entries of Ril
are nonzero and let rl be the vector containing the nonzero
entries of R•l. Define fl(xl) = r
ᵀ
l (
xl
2 −bl) · (rᵀl xl). Then
`n(w) = gn
(
f1(P
ᵀ
1w), . . . , fL(P
ᵀ
Lw)
)
.
It is an exercise to check the game is strongly-typed.
Example: Disentangling latent factors. We continue
the discussion of blind source separation and safety. Sup-
pose that the mixing matrix decomposes into blocks
M =
M1•...
MN•

The blocks generate multiple views on a single latent signal,
(Kakade & Foster, 2007; McWilliams et al., 2013; Benton
et al., 2017). The nth view is Mn•S.
As in the example in section 4.1, now suppose there are N
sets of observed signals generated fromN sets of latent sig-
nals. Each agent attempts to find the principal component
specific to its view on its set of observations. Corollary 2
implies that the problems{
argmax
{wn:‖wn‖2=1}
wᵀX(n)(X(n))ᵀw
}N
n=1
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can be safely optimized using gradient descent if the mix-
ing matrix has the block form
Mn• = Pnn ·Rn•
where Pnn is orthogonal and Rn• is diagonal. In
other words, if the views are generated by rescaling and
changing-the-basis of the latent signals.
The open and block settings share a common theme: Safe
disentangling requires observed signals that are generated
by a single (structured) mixing process applied to (arbi-
trary) sets of independent latent signals. The same phe-
nomenon arises in multi-player games, resulting in tensor
decompositions that generalize ICA.
5. Multi-Player Games and Tensor-SVD
A classic N -player strategic game consists in finite action-
sets An and losses `n : A =
∏N
n=1An → R. Enumerate
the elements of each set as An = [Dn], and encode the
losses as (D1, . . . , DN )-tensors
An[α1, . . . , αN ] := `n(α1, . . . , αN ) where αn ∈ [Dn].
Given a collection of N such tensors, define the corre-
sponding multilinear game1 as
`n(w1, . . . ,wN ) = An ×1 w1 × · · · ×N wN
:=
D1,...,DN∑
α1,...,αN=1
A[α1, . . . , αN ] ·w1[α1] · · ·wN [αN ].
The classic example is when actions are drawn from the
Dn-simplex 4Dn = {wn ∈ RDn :
∑Dn
α=1 wn[α] =
1 and wn[α] ≥ 0 for all α}.
We now recall the orthogonal tensor decomposition or ten-
sor SVD (Zhang & Golub, 2001; Chen & Saad, 2009). A
tensor admits a tensor-SVD if it can be written in the form
A =
L∑
l=1
dl · u1l ⊗ · · · ⊗ uNl = D×1 U1 × · · · ×N UN
where Un is a (Dn × L)-matrix with orthogonal columns
andD is a diagonal (L, . . . , L)-tensor.
Corollary 3. A multilinear game is safe if it admits a si-
multaneous tensor-SVD
A(n) = D(n) ×1 U1 × · · · ×N UN
where the diagonals have the same sign coordinatewise.
1We use the n-mode product notation ×n, see de Lathauwer
et al. (2000).
Proof. Let gn(z) =
∑L
l=1 d
(n)
l zl and fl(x) =
∏
n xn. De-
fine Pl as the (D ×N)-matrix whose nth column is unl in
the block of rows corresponding to wn and zero elsewhere.
Then
`n(w) = gn
(
f1(P
ᵀ
1w), . . . , fL(P
ᵀ
Lw)
)
and the game is strongly-typed.
Not all tensors admit a tensor-SVD. However, all tensors
do admit a higher-order SVD (de Lathauwer et al., 2000).
Section A5 explains why simultaneous HOSVD does not
guarantee safety and the stronger tensor-SVD is required.
Example: Disentangling latent factors Suppose S is a
latent signal with independent non-Gaussian coordinates.
We observe X = PS +  where P is a (D × L) mixing
matrix and  is Gaussian noise. By whitening the signal
as a preprocessing step, one can ensure the columns of P
are orthogonal. ICA recovers S from the cumulants of X,
see Hyva¨rinen et al. (2001). The main insight is that the
4th-order cumulant tensor admits a tensor-SVD:
A[i, j, k, l] = cum(xi, xj , xk, xl)
=
∑
o,p,q,r
PioPjpPkqPlr · cum(so, sp, sq, sr)
=
∑
r
PirPjrPkrPlr · kurt(sr)
since cum(so, sp, sq, sr) = 0 unless o = p = s = r be-
cause the signals are independent. The expression can be
writtenA = K×1P×2P×3P×4P where diagonal tensor
K specifies the kurtosis of the latent signal. In other words,
computing the tensor-SVD recovers the mixing matrix and
allows to recover the latent signal up to basic symmetries.
Following the same prescription as the examples above, if
there are N sets of observations generated from N latent
signals by the same mixing matrix, then the resulting cu-
mulant tensors satisfy corollary 3.
6. Biologically Plausible Backpropagation
Our ultimate goal is to apply strong-typing to safely opti-
mize neural nets with multiple loss functions (Marblestone
et al., 2016). Doing so requires constructing variants of
backprop that allow the propagation of multiple error sig-
nals. First steps in this direction have been taken with bio-
logically plausible models of backprop that introduce addi-
tional degrees of freedom into the algorithm.
Feedback alignment is a recent algorithm with compa-
rable empirical performance to backprop. It is also more
biologically plausible since it loosens backprop’s require-
ment that forward- and back- propagating weights are sym-
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metric (Lillicrap et al., 2016). The main theoretical result
of the paper, see their supplementary information, is
Theorem. Let δBP = Wᵀe denote the error backpropa-
gated one layer of the neural network. Under certain con-
ditions, the error signal computed by feedback alignment,
δFA = Be, satisfies
δFA = α ·W†e where α > 0
and W† is the pseudoinverse of W.
Proof. See theorem 2 of Lillicrap et al. (2016).
Corollary 4. Under the same conditions, feedback align-
ment is safe.
Proof. We require to check 〈δFA, δBP 〉 ≥ 0. Applying
the theorem obtains
〈δFA, δBP 〉 = α · 〈W†e,Wᵀe〉 = α · 〈WW†e, e〉.
Observe that WW† is an orthogonal projection by stan-
dard properties of the pseudoinverse so
〈δFA, δBP 〉 = α · 〈WW†e,WW†e〉 ≥ 0
as required.
In fact, Lillicrap et al. (2016) provide experimental and the-
oretical evidence that feedback alignment learns to align
the feedforward weights with the pseudoinverse of the
backconnections. In other words, they argue that feedback
alignment learns safe gradients.
Another variant of backprop is kickback, which loosens
backprop’s requirement that there are distinct forward- and
backward signals (Balduzzi et al., 2015). Kickback trun-
cates backprop’s error signals so that the network learns
from just the feedforward sweep together with scalar error
signals. One of the main results of Balduzzi et al. (2015) is
that kickback is safe, see section A6.
7. Conclusion
Backprop provides a general-purpose tool to train config-
urations of differentiable modules that share a single ob-
jective. However, effectively training populations of neural
networks on potentially conflicting tasks, such that they au-
tomatically exploit synergies and avoid damaging incom-
patibilities (such as unlearning old features that are not use-
ful on a new task) requires fundamentally new ideas.
A key piece of the puzzle is to develop type systems that
can be used to (i) guarantee when certain optimizations can
be safely performed jointly and (ii) flag potential conflicts
so that the incompatible optimization problems can be sep-
arated. The paper provides a first step in this direction.
From a different perspective, convex methods have played
an enormous role in optimization yet their relevance to
deep learning is limited. The approach to strong-typing
developed here is inspired by and extends certain features
of convexity. One of the goals of this paper is to carve
out some of the key concepts underlying convex geometry
and reassemble them into a more flexible, but still power-
ful framework. The proposed definition of strong-typing
should be considered a first and far from final attempt.
A large class of natural examples is generated by imposing
strong-typing on simple quadratic and multilinear games.
It turns out that, in these settings, strong-typing yields
the same matrix and tensor decompositions that arise in
blind source separation and independent component anal-
ysis, where multiple latent signals are mixed by the same
structured process. An important future direction is to dis-
entangle nonlinear latent factors.
Strong-typing and safety in neural nets. We conclude
by discussing the relevance of the framework to neural net-
works. Firstly, neural nets and strong-typing have many of
the same ingredients: neural nets combine linear algebra
(matrix multiplications and convolutions) with monotonic
functions (sigmoids, tanhs, rectifiers, and max-pooling
amongst others). Rectifiers and sigmoids have the addi-
tional feature that their outputs are always positive.
Secondly, there is a deeper connection between rectifiers
and strong-typing. Rectifiers are orthogonal projections
on weights: ρ(Wᵀx) zeroes out the columns wl of W for
which wᵀl x ≤ 0. Rectifiers are more sophisticated projec-
tions than we have previously considered because they are
context-dependent. The columns that are zeroed out de-
pend on W and x: the rectifier-projection takes W and x
as parameters, compare remarks 1 and 2 in the appendix.
Representation learning in rectifier networks can thus be
recast as learning parameterized type structures. An inter-
esting future direction is to consider tensor-switching net-
works (Tsai et al., 2016), which decouple a neuron’s deci-
sion to activate from the information it passes along (for a
rectifier, both depend on Wᵀx).
Finally, it has long been known that the brain does not use
backprop (Crick, 1989). One possibility is that backprop is
the optimal deep learning algorithm which, unfortunately,
evolution failed to stumble upon. Another is that there are
evolutionary advantages to not using backpropagation. For
example, it has been argued that the brain optimizes multi-
ple loss functions (Marblestone et al., 2016). Does jointly
optimizing or satisficing multiple objectives require learn-
ing mechanisms with more degrees of freedom than back-
prop (Balduzzi et al., 2015; Lillicrap et al., 2016)? Safety
and strong-typing provide the tools needed to frame and
investigate the question.
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APPENDIX
A1. Proof of Theorem 1
For completeness we recall the notion of Nash equilibrium,
generalized to our setup:
Definition A1. The point w∗ ∈ H is a Nash equilibrium if
for all players n and for all w satisfying w∗+pin(w) ∈ H
it holds that
`n(w
∗) ≤ `n(w∗ + pin(w)).
This section completes theorem 1 when gradient descent
converges to the boundary of the feasible set. To ensure
actions stay in the feasible set we use gradient updates of
the form
wt+1 = ProjH(w
t − piρ(n)(ξtn)) where
ProjH(x˜) = argmin
x∈H
‖x− x˜‖2.
Proof. A point on the boundary of H is a critical point
of Φ if the gradient is zero or points perpendicularly
out the constraint set. Since 〈pim(∇Φ),∇ `m〉 ≥
αm‖pim(∇ `m)‖22 ≥ 0 for all players m, it follows that
gradient descent by the players, with step sizes decaying as
1√
T
, will converge to a critical point of Φ. Critical points
of Φ are Nash equilibria of the game by convexity of the
losses as a function of their players’ actions.
A2. The natural gradient is safe
The natural gradient was introduced in Amari (1998) and
is widely used in machine learning.
Theorem. The direction of steepest descent at `(wt) on
Riemannian manifold (Rn,G) is
ξt ∝ G−1(wt) · ∇ `(wt).
The natural gradient is the direction G−1(wt) · ∇ `(wt).
Proof. We follow Amari (1998). The problem reduces to
the constrained minimization
argmin
{ξ:∑Gij(wt)ξiξj=1}
[
`(wt) + ∇ `(wt)ᵀξ
]
which can be rewritten as
argmin
ξ
[
∇ `(wt)ᵀξ − λξᵀG(wt)ξ
]
with solution
ξt ∝ G−1(wt)∇ `(wt)
as required.
Corollary A1. The natural gradient is safe.
The proof is obvious. We include it to highlight the role of
latent types, diagonalization and positivity.
Proof. We are required to show that
〈G−1(w)∇ `(w),∇ `(w)〉 ≥ 0 for all w. (A1)
The metric is symmetric positive definite, and so admits
factorization
G(wt) = P(w) ·D(w) ·Pᵀ(w)
where P(w) is an orthogonal matrix and D(w) strictly
positive diagonal for all w. After setting ∇˜`(w) :=
Pᵀ(w)∇ `(w), the condition in (A1) can be rewritten as
〈D−1(w)∇˜`(w), ∇˜`(w)〉 ≥ 0
which clearly holds.
Remark 1 (parametric types). The columns pi(w) of P(w)
define a parametric family of latent type systems τ i(w) =
pi(w) · pᵀi (w) that is parametrized by w.
A3. Mirror descent is safe
We show that mirror descent is safe. The fact that mir-
ror descent is well-behaved is far from new; there is an
extensive literature analyzing its convergence properties
(Bubeck, 2015). Our purpose is to highlight the type struc-
tures underlying convex duality and mirror descent.
The approach generalizes the analysis of Newton’s method.
The role played by transform that diagonalizes the Hessian
in section 3.2 is taken over by the Legendre transform here.
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Convex duality. The exposition closely follows Amari
(2009). Consider the manifold M = RD with coordinate
system w = (w1, . . . , wD). Let ψ : M → R be a twice-
differentiable strictly convex function. It follows that the
Hessian of ψ,
gij(w) = ∂i∂jψ(w)
is a positive definite matrix for all w which defines a Rie-
mannian metric on the manifold M . Concretely, the dis-
tance between infinitesimally close points w and w + dw
is
ds2 =
∑
ij
gij(w)dw
idwj .
Define the dual coordinate system
θ = ∇ψ(w), i.e. θi = ∂ψ
∂wi
(w).
Recall that the Legendre transform of ψ,
ψ∗(θ) = max
w
{wᵀθ − ψ(w)},
satisfies the relation
ψ(w) + ψ∗(θ)−wᵀθ = 0,
which allows to recover the original coordinates from the
dual system:
w = ∇ψ∗(θ) i.e. wi = ∂ψ
∗
∂θi
(θ).
Define the dual metric
gij(θ) =
∂2
∂θi∂θj
ψ∗(θ).
Theorem. The metrics gij(w) and gij(θ) are inverse.
That is
dθ = G(w)dw and dw = G−1(θ)dθ.
Proof. See Amari (2009).
Remark 2 (parametric types). Convex duality can thus be
rephrased as a relationship between two parametric fami-
lies of types on the tangent spaces to the manifold that is
encoded in the Riemannian metric and its inverse.
Mirror descent is safe. We show that mirror descent
is safe by applying convex duality following Raskutti &
Mukherjee (2015). Let ψ be a strictly convex twice dif-
ferentiable function. The Bregman divergence of ψ is
Dψ(v,w) = ψ(v)− ψ(w)− 〈∇ψ(w),v −w〉.
Theorem. Given loss function ` and strictly convex twice
differentiable ψ, both defined on M = RD, the mirror de-
scent step
wt+1 = argmin
w
{
wᵀ∇ `(wt) + 1
ηt
Dψ(w,w
t)
}
,
is equivalent to the natural gradient descent step
θt+1 = θt − ηt · [∇2 ψ∗(θt)]−1 · ∇ `(θt).
in the dual coordinate system.
Proof. We sketch the proof in Raskutti & Mukherjee
(2015), which should be consulted for details. Computing
the minimizer in mirror descent by differentiating shows
that the mirror descent update is equivalent, in dual coordi-
nates, to
θt+1 = θt − ηt · ∇w `(∇ψ∗(θt))
Applying the chain rule obtains
∇w `(∇ψ∗(θt)) =
[∇2 ψ∗(θt)]−1 · ∇θ `(∇ψ∗(θt))
so that mirror descent can be rewritten as
θt+1 = θt − ηt · [∇2 ψ∗(θt)]−1 · ∇θ `(∇ψ∗(θt))
as required.
Corollary A2. If ψ is twice-differentiable and strictly con-
vex then mirror descent is safe.
Proof. Combine corollary A1 with the equivalence of mir-
ror descent and the natural gradient.
A4. Direct proofs of corollaries 1 and 2
Direct proof of corollary 1.
Proof. Safety requires
〈∇ `n,∇ `m〉 = (A(n)w−b(n))ᵀ(A(m)w−b(m)) ≥ 0.
Plugging in the assumptions yields
〈∇ `n,∇ `m〉 = (w − b)ᵀPD(n)D(m)Pᵀ(w − b) ≥ 0
which is positive by inspection.
Direct proof of corollary 2.
Proof. The gradient and projected gradient are
∇ `n = wᵀA(n) + b(n) and
pin(∇ `n) = wᵀA(n)•n + b(n)n
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After imposing b(n) = A(n)b, safety requires that
(w − b)ᵀA(m)•m A(n)m•(w − b) ≥ 0 for all w, m and n.
Applying the remaining conditions and setting x =
RᵀPᵀ(w − b) obtains
xᵀD(m)Rᵀ•mRm•D
(n)x ≥ 0
Since Rm• is diagonal, it follows that D(m)R
ᵀ
•mRm•D(n)
is a product of diagonal matrices. The expression is posi-
tive since D(m)D(n) ≥ 0 by assumption.
A5. Higher-order SVD
Any N -tensor admits a higher-order SVD (HOSVD),
whereas not every tensor admits a tensor-SVD. In this sec-
tion we recall the concept of HOSVD and show why simul-
taneous HOSVD is not sufficient to guarantee safety. The
section relies heavily on notation taken from de Lathauwer
et al. (2000) which the reader is encouraged to consult for
details and context.
Definition A2 (matricization). The matricization of ten-
sor A over its nth mode, denoted A(n) is an Dn ×
(Dn+1Dn+2 · · ·DND1D2 · · ·Dn−1)-matrix that contains
the element A[α1, . . . , αN ] at the position with row num-
ber αn and column number
(αn+1 − 1)Dn+2Dn+3 · · ·DND1 · · ·Dn−1
+(αn+2 − 1)Dn+3Dn+4 · · ·DND1 · · ·Dn−1 + · · ·
+(αN − 1)D1D2 · · ·Dn−1 + (α1 − 1)D2D3 · · ·Dn−1
+(α2 − 1)D3D4 · · ·Dn−1 + · · ·+ αn−1
Let us recall the notion of higher-order SVD (HOSVD)
from de Lathauwer et al. (2000).
Theorem. Every (I1, . . . , IN )-tensorA can be written as
a product
A = S ×1 U1 ×2 U2 · · · ×N UN
in which
1. Ui is a unitary (Ii × Ii) matrix
2. S is a (I1 × I2 · · · IN )-tensor of which the subtensors
Sin=α, obtained by fixing the nth index to α have the
properties of
(a) all-orthogonality: two subtensors Sin=α and
Sin=β are orthogonal for all possible values of
n, α and β subject to α 6= β:
〈Sin=α,Sin=β〉 = 0 when α 6= β
(b) ordering:
‖Sin=1‖ ≥ ‖Sin=2‖ ≥ · · · ≥ ‖Sin=In‖ ≥ 0
for all possible values of n.
The Frobenius-norms ‖Sin=i‖, symbolized by σ(n)i
are n-mode singular values ofA and the vector U(n)i
is an ith n-mode singular vector.
Proof. See de Lathauwer et al. (2000).
An important property of the HOSVD is as follows. Let
A = S ×1 U1 × · · · ×N UN be the HOSVD ofA. Then
the matricization is
A(n) = U
nΣn(Vn)ᵀ
is an SVD of A(n), where the diagonal matrix Σ
n ∈
RDn×Dn and the columnwise orthonormal matrix Vn ∈
RDn+1Dn+2···DND1D2···Dn−1×Dn are defined as
Σn := diag(σn1 , . . . , σ
n
Dn),
(Vn)ᵀ := S˜(n)
(
Un+1 ⊗ · · ·UN ⊗U1 ⊗ · · ·Un−1)ᵀ
where S˜n is a normalized version of the matricization S(n)
of S, with rows rescaled to unit-length: S(n) = Σn · S˜n.
A5.1. Discussion of safety and HOSVD
To somewhat reduce the proliferation of subscripts and su-
perscripts, we work with two tensors denoted A and B,
which stand in for the tensors of two players A(m) and
A(n) in an N -player game.
Lemma A1. LetA[wnˆ] be the Dn-vector
A[wnˆ] := A×1w1×· · ·×n−1wn−1×n+1wn+1×· · ·×NwN
where note the term wn is omitted from the expression, and
similarly for B. Then
〈pin∇ `A,∇ `B〉 = A[wnˆ]ᵀ ·B[wnˆ]
Proof. Direct computation.
Lemma A2. Let vec(wnˆ) denote the
(D1D2 · · ·Dn−1Dn+1 · · ·Dn)-vector given by
vec(wnˆ) = vec(w1⊗· · ·⊗wn−1⊗wn+1⊗· · ·⊗wN )
and suppose that the matricization has SVD A(n) =
UnΣn(Vn)ᵀ. ThenA[wnˆ] is the Dn-vector
A[wnˆ] = UnΣn(Vn)ᵀ vec(wnˆ).
Proof. Direct computation.
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Lemma A3.
〈pin∇ `A,∇ `B〉
= vec(wnˆ)
ᵀV(n)A Σ
n
AΣ
n
B(V
n
B)
ᵀ vec(wnˆ).
Proof. By the above working,
〈pin∇ `A,∇ `B〉
= vec(wnˆ)
ᵀV(n)A Σ
n
A(U
n
A)
ᵀUnBΣ
n
B(V
n
B)
ᵀ vec(wnˆ).
Recall that
(Vn)ᵀ := S˜(n)
(
Un+1 ⊗ · · ·UN ⊗U1 ⊗ · · ·Un−1)ᵀ
so that
Σn(Vn)ᵀ = S(n)
(
Un+1 ⊗ · · ·UN ⊗U1 ⊗ · · ·Un−1)ᵀ
which we shorten to
Σn(Vn)ᵀ = S(n)
(
U˜nˆ
)ᵀ
It follows that 〈pin∇ `A,∇ `B〉 equals
vec(wnˆ)
ᵀU˜nˆAS
ᵀ
(n)T(n)(U
nˆ
B)
ᵀ vec(wnˆ).
and the result follows.
We are finally in a position to explain why simultaneous
HOSVD is insufficient to guarantee safety. That is, we are
in a position to explain why
A = S ×1 U1 ×2 U2 · · · ×N UN
B = T ×1 U1 ×2 U2 · · · ×N UN
does not guarantee 〈pi1(∇ `A),∇ `B〉 ≥ 0. Our strategy
for guaranteeing safety hinges on simultaneous diagonal-
ization. However, HOSVD does not guarantee that the core
S is diagonal. Instead, it introduces the condition of simul-
taneous orthogonality on subtensors of S.
Unfortunately, there is nothing to guarantee that the cores
S and T of two different tensors are “simultaneously all-
orthogonal” across the two tensors. In other words, there is
nothing to guarantee that the product of their matricizations
Sᵀ(n)T(n)
is diagonal in general. A specific setting where this holds
is when the two tensors A and B admits a simultaneous
tensor-SVD. It is an open question whether the condition
can be guaranteed in a naturally-occurring more general
setting.
A6. Kickback is safe
Kickback is a complementary algorithm to feedback align-
ment that is motivated by the observation that neurons com-
municate via a single kind of signal, spikes, rather than us-
ing the two kinds of signals (the feedforward sweep and
backpropagated errors) required by backprop (Balduzzi
et al., 2015).
Kickback is a truncated version of backprop that computes
gradient-estimates using the feedforward sweep together
with global error/reward signals. The error signals take the
form of a single scalar value broadcast to the entire net-
work, for example via neuromodulators. One of the main
results of the paper is that
Theorem. If neurons are coherent then kickback is safe.
Proof. See theorem 4 of Balduzzi et al. (2015).
Coherence is, essentially, a positivity condition on synap-
tic weights that ensures the gradient-estimates computed
by kickback have positive inner product with the gradients
computed by backprop.
A7. Comparison with Strongly-Typed RNNs
Typed linear algebra was proposed in Balduzzi & Ghifary
(2016) (STNN), which applied the framework to analyze
and simplify recurrent neural networks. The definition of
typed vector space in this paper is more general than in
STNN – it replaces an orthogonal basis with orthogonal
projections.
No formal definition of strong-typing was provided in
STNN. Informally, STNN stated: “We refer to architec-
tures as strongly-typed when they both (i) preserve the type
structure of their features and (ii) separate learned param-
eters from state-dependence”. The definition of strong-
typing in the main text, definition 5 is different from strong-
typing in STNN, although it draws on similar intuitions.
The settings are sufficiently disparate that no confusion
should result.
